Séminaire des équipes-projets

Tag Size Does Matter: Attacks and Proofs for the TLS Record Protocol

A 14h00, entrée libre

  • Date : 24/11/2011
  • Lieu : École Normale Supérieure, Amphi Évariste Galois - NIR
  • Intervenants : Kenny Paterson (Royal Holloway, University of London)

We analyze the security of the TLS Record Protocol, a MAC-then-Encode-then-Encrypt (MEE) scheme whose design targets confidentiality and integrity for application layer communications on the Internet.
Our main results are twofold. First, we describe a new distinguishing attack against TLS when variable length padding and short (truncated) MACs are used. This combination will arise when standardized TLS 1.2 extensions (RFC 6066) are implemented. Second, we show that when tags are longer, the TLS Record Protocol meets a new length-hiding authenticated encryption security notion that is stronger than IND-CCA security.
Joint work with Thomas Ristenpart and Thomas Shrimpton.

Mots-clés : Attacks TLS record protocol Équipe-projet CASCADE Proofs

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